



Joint Discussion Paper 
Series in Economics 
by the Universities of 
Aachen · Gießen · Göttingen 







Jana Brandt and Jürgen Meckl and Ivan Savin 
 
 



















This paper can be downloaded from 
http://www.uni-marburg.de/fb02/makro/forschung/magkspapers/index_html%28magks%29 
 
Coordination: Bernd Hayo • Philipps-University Marburg 
Faculty of Business Administration and Economics • Universitätsstraße 24, D-35032 Marburg 






Göttingen  MAGKS Factor{Biased Technical Change and
Specialization Patterns
Jana Brandt , J urgen Meckl and Ivan Saviny
Abstract
We analyze the medium{ and long{run eects of international integra-
tion of capital markets on specialization patterns of countries. For that
purpose, we incorporate induced technical change into a Heckscher{Ohlin
model with a continuum of nal goods. This provides a comprehensive the-
ory that explains the dynamics of comparative advantages based on dier-
ences in eective factor endowments. Our model constitutes an appropriate
framework for understanding the changes in industrial structure of foreign
trade observed, e.g., in the CEE countries over the last two decades. In
addition, our approach provides a theoretical foundation for the empirical
prospective comparative advantage index (Savin and Winker 2009) with
new insights into the future dynamics of comparative advantages. Even-
tually, the model may serve as a basis to set development priorities in
countries being in the period of transition.
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11 Introduction
In this study we analyze the dynamics of comparative advantages (CAs) con-
sidering an endogenous technical change framework (see, e.g., Romer (1990),
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992)) and allowing for
technical change to be directed in favor of one of the production factors. Analyz-
ing motivation of companies to invest in technologies, Acemoglu (2002) identies
two main forces aecting the factor{biased technical change (FBTC): a price
eect and a market size eect. These two forces work in opposite directions:
the former fosters technologies with lacking production factors and, respectively,
more expensive goods, while the latter directs technical change towards abundant
factors, i.e. with potentially larger economies of scale.
While this framework provides an instrument predicting the direction of tech-
nical change during the last century in the developed countries, it fails to explain
the capital-biased technical change observed in certain economies in transition. In
particular, developing countries lacking capital before integration of factor mar-
kets are expected to experience technical bias towards (unskilled) labor intensive
goods (Acemoglu 2002, p 801). But this result is not always true.
A good example is presented by the Central and Eastern European (CEE)1
countries that have recently passed a transition period of their economies and
joined the EU. According to Zaghini (2005), most of these countries had exces-
sive natural and labor resources in comparison to other EU countries specializing
(at the beginning of 1990s) in sectors that used these resources more intensively,
e.g., products of steel and glass, agricultural goods. Nevertheless, during a period
of ten years these countries gained CAs in some capital intensive industries, e.g.,
transport, machinery building and electronics. This is in contrast with Acemoglu
(2002) that the new EU members were anticipated to 'concentrate' on their CAs,
instead of diversifying them. Further examples controverting the existing litera-
ture are newly industrialized countries (e.g., Taiwan, South Korea, China) that
experienced a rapid growth in their CAs in capital intensive goods in response to
capital inow and trade liberalization (see, e.g., Rugman and Collinson (2006)).
Consider Figure 1 as an illustration. The Figure plots dynamics of CAs mea-
sured by the Lafay index (LFI, Lafay (1992)) for a pooled sample of eight CEE
1The CEE countries consist of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovak Re-
public, Cyprus, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
2countries (excluding Cyprus and Malta) in high tech items according to UNIDO
(2003)2 in the period 1993{2000. In addition, the pooled FDI inows for the
sample of countries over the same period are shown.3 One sees that the inow
of capital into the CEE countries is accompanied by a rapid growth of CAs in
capital intensive goods, which contradicts Acemoglu (2002).
Figure 1: Pooled FDI inows and LFI in high tech goods in the CEE countries
Further empirical evidence on the positive impact of factor inow on technical
change can be found, among others, in Borbely (2005) and Radosevic and Roze-
ick (2005). In particular, for the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary Borbely
(2005) identies a considerable growth in the R&D intensity in capital inten-
sive industries (e.g., chemicals, machinery and equipment) being accompanied by
massive inow of FDI in those countries, while Radosevic and Rozeick (2005) de-
termine a signicant eect of FDI on both productivity and export performance
for the CEE countries in the automotive industry.
2The pooled LFI index is calculated for the following product groups: medicinal and phar-
maceutical products (541), steam & other vapor power units, steam eng. (712), rotating elec-
tric plant and parts (716), other power generating machinery and parts (718), oce machines
(751), automatic data processing machines & units (752), parts of and accessories suitable
for 751 (759), television receivers (761), telecommunications equipment and parts (764), elec-
tric power machinery and parts thereof (771), electric apparatus for medical purposes (774),
thermionic,cold & photo-cathode valves, tub (776), electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s.
(778), aircraft & associated equipment and parts (792), optical instruments and apparatus (871),
measuring, checking, analyzing instruments (874) and photographic apparatus and equipment
(881). The data on the LFI indices were kindly provided by Andrea Zaghini (CFS, Frankfurt).
3The data on the FDI inows is from the EU Foreign Direct Investment Yearbook 2001.
3To resolve this puzzle, we integrate the FBTC concept into a neoclassical
Heckscher{Ohlin (HO hereafter) framework with a continuum of nal goods
(Dornbusch et al. 1980). The HO{model explains how CA is related to a country's
relative factor supplies for given technologies, while the FBTC concept explains
how technical change is induced by changes in relative factor endowments. Treer
(1993, 1995) emphasized that dierences in factor supplies have to be analyzed in
conjunction with technology dierences between countries to be consistent with
empirical ndings on the factor content of international trade. We take up his
suggestion and consider factor endowments in 'eective units' as basis for factor{
abundance driven trade. The eciency of physical factor endowments, however,
is determined endogenously by investment into the division of factors.
Other studies also account for technology dierences between countries in a
HO{type model as developed by Dornbusch et al. (1980). Zhu and Treer (2005)
explain factor{price inequalities through exogenous technological convergence be-
tween countries, while Zhu (2007) examines welfare implications of this type of
convergence. In contrast, to our knowledge the present paper is the rst that
analyzes factors triggering this technology convergence by endogenizing decisions
to invest in new technologies.
Integrating the HO{model with the FBTC concept provides a theory that
can explain the dynamics of CAs based on dierences in factor endowments. In
particular, we argue that an inow of a factor through the international factor
market integration causes, rst, the price eect reducing production costs of factor
intensive goods and, second, the market size eect inducing companies to innovate
in the respective sector and further reducing relative prices. In this way, this paper
explains the progression of CAs in the CEE countries over time (see, e.g., Savin
and Winker (2009, p 123)). The speed of reaction of CAs in response to capital
inow can vary across countries and sectors. This is mainly due to dierent time
periods and factor stocks required to conduct R&D and produce goods, which
are in demand in the home country and abroad.4
To this end, consider as an example dynamics of FDI inows and stocks in
Hungary vis{ a{vis its LFI in optical, photo, technical, medical apparatus (group
90 in the UN Comtrade Harmonized System) on Figure 2.5 In contrast to the
4This can be also caused by dierent 'catching-up' scenarios observed in productivity levels
in emerging and developing countries (see Stehrer and Woerz (2003)).
5The data on the FDI is obtained from the Hungarian National Bank, while the LFI index
4pooled sample of high tech goods, no CA was formed in this sector in Hungary till
the end of 1990s. However, within the next ve years the situation has changed
dramatically. This illustrates that the inow of capital with the resulting price
eect alone might not be enough to form a CA. One needs a certain time period to
advance technologies in this sector and produce goods, which are in a requisition.
Figure 2: FDI inows and stocks vis{ a{vis LFI in Hungary
This study is useful not only for understanding dynamics of CAs in the past,
but also for analyzing their future dynamics. In particular, there is a parallel
between this model and the idea of the prospective comparative advantage (PCA)
instrument that can be used in forecasting CAs (Savin and Winker 2009).
In addition, we summarize our ideas on implications of this model for in-
dustrial policies in transition economies. In particular, we argue that countries
can stimulate technical change by enhancing an inow of the respective factor
and by mitigating potential ineciencies on the market of so{called technology
producers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model assump-
tions. In Sections 3 and 4 the static and the dynamic equilibrium of the model
are given. In Section 5 we introduce international capital{market integration and
analyze dynamics of CAs conditional upon changes in factor endowments. In Sec-
tion 6 the the model is compared with the concept of PCAs and its implications
for industrial policy are discussed. Section 7 concludes.
is calculated based on data from the UN COMTRADE Database.
52 The Model
2.1 Consumer Problem
Consumers in all countries are assumed to have identical preferences of the con-








where  is the rate of time preference and  is the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution. C is a Cobb{Douglas type consumption aggregator dened over a





with d(z;t) denoting the consumption of product z at time t, Z being a measure
of the set of available nal products and  indicating the share of product z in the
consumption of Z (identical 8 z). We drop the time argument t in the following
as long as this causes no confusion.
2.2 Production Sector
Suppose that nal goods are produced from intermediates YK and YL. Further-







where pj represents the prices of intermediate goods Yj (j = K;L), and A is
a parameter of the technology. The market for nal goods is assumed to be
competitive. Final goods are assumed to be freely traded internationally.
Intermediate goods are produced by using specialized machines according to
















where  2 (0;1), and xj(n) denotes the input of variety n 2 [0;Nj] of type j
6machine in production of intermediate good Yj (j = K;L). Nj measures the range
of available machines of type j, i.e.: type{j machines that have been invented
in the past. The markets for intermediates are supposed to be fully competitive;
however, intermediate goods are assumed to be non-tradable.
Machines of each type j are supplied by technology monopolists. For Sec-
tion 3, we take the NK and NL as given; in Section 4 we analyze the innovation
decisions that determine NK and NL. We assume that machines cannot be traded
internationally. For simplicity, we assume that all machines are fully used up in
production. The technology for producing machines is supposed to be as follows:
xK(n) = K(n) and xL(n) = L(n): (5)
Our model is completed by factor markets. To keep things simple, factor
endowments of capital K and labor L are assumed to be given exogenously.
3 Static Equilibrium
A static equilibrium for given (NK;NL) consists of a set of prices for machines
(qK(n);qL(n)) that maximize prots of technology monopolists, machine demands
from the intermediate producers (xK(n);xL(n)) that maximize intermediate pro-
ducers' prots, prices of intermediates (pK;pL) that clear the market for inter-
mediates, the range of nal goods (z) that is produced by a country, and factor
prices (wK;wL) that clear factor markets.
Prot maximization of the producers of intermediates (taking as given the
















; j = K;L:
(6)







Yj ; j = K;L: (7)
Demand for each variety of type{j machine is increasing in the price of the re-
7spective intermediate good j and in the demand for intermediate good j, but is
decreasing in the price of the respective machine.
Technology monopolists take the demand for their machines in (7) and the













; j = K;L: (8)





; j = K;L: (9)
Since (9) holds for all technology monopolists producing j{type machines, we












Yj  xj ; j = K;L: (11)
As a result of these symmetries, the production functions for intermediate goods




j xj ; j = K;L: (12)









Due to the symmetry of machine producers, these conditions reduce to
K = NKxK ; L = NLxL :











K K and N

1 
L L can be interpreted as eective endowments of
factors K and L. Due to technical progress, physical factor endowments become




the following, we will refer to N

1 
j as a measure of factor productivity.
The equilibrium prices for intermediates can now be derived. Perfect compe-
tition on the markets for intermediates implies that prices have to be equal to
unit costs. With our specication of the production functions in (4), and making












; j = K;L:















Before we turn to the two-country equilibrium, let us solve the equilibrium for
a closed economy producing a range of nal goods z 2 [z;z]. From our Cobb{
Douglas specication of consumer preferences in (2) we derive the market{clearing
condition for nal products as

















9Substituting for Y (z) by (16) and with prices equal to unit costs in the nal goods




















Making use of our specication of the unit{cost function in (3) we nally get the













Equilibrium on the market for intermediate goods can then be derived by
equating relative supplies (from (14)) with relative demands from (17); apply-

















with !  wK=wL. The function  has the derivatives @(z;z)=@z > 0, and
@(z;z)=@z > 0.
There exists a unique value ! that clears factor markets. Since K=L is inde-
pendent of !, and lim!!0 (z;z)=! = 1 and lim!!1 (z;z)=! = 0, there exists
a unique equilibrium value of !. Figure 3 illustrates the equilibrium on factor
markets. The equilibrium value of ! depends positively on both z and z. The
intuition for this result is as follows: Note that due to our specication of tech-
nology for nal products in (3), and together with (14), nal goods are ordered
according to their factor intensities such that capital intensity rises with the index
z. Then, any increase in either z or in z raises the average capital intensity used
10in production of nal goods and, therefore, raises the relative demand for capital
at each value of !; with given factor supplies, this change in the relative demand
for capital raises !.
Figure 3: Static equilibrium in the closed economy
The closed{economy equilibrium is now completely determined. With ! de-
termined by (18) and normalizing one factor price to unity, equilibrium prices for
intermediate goods are determined by (15), equilibrium machine prices by (10)
and nal{goods' prices by (3).
Two country model with specialization in production
The equilibrium in the two{country model is to be completed by determining
the range of goods that is produced by each country. For that, we assume that
the complete range of nal goods produced in either country is given by the
interval [0;1]. Suppose that the home country produces nal products z such that
z 2 [0;z0], while the foreign country produces nal products z such that z 2 [z0;1].
This pattern of specialization implicitly assumes that the home country has CA
over the range of goods z 2 [0;z0], whereas the foreign country has CA over the
range of z 2 [z0;1] goods. In what follows, we show that this pattern of CAs
arises from suciently great dierences in relative factor supplies. Throughout
11the analysis, we assume that both countries have access to identical technologies
for producing nal goods (i.e.: both countries have the same cost function for
producing z). However, both factor prices and prices of intermediates will dier
due to complete specialization.
Our specialization pattern can be rationalized by suciently great dierences
in relative eective factor endowments with the home country being the labor
abundant country. As we will show, equilibrium factor prices then are related by
! > !, denoting the foreign country's variables with asterisk.
Proof
Our proof is in two steps. Step I shows that the above mentioned pattern of
specialization arises i pK=pL > p
K=p
L. Step II shows that for this pattern of
specialization to occur in equilibrium, a suciently great dierence in the relative
endowments of eective factors is required.
Step I
In case of specialization, we rst have to identify the threshold z0 that deter-
mines the range of products produced in each country. With perfect competition












































Suppose that pK=pL > p
K=p
L. Then,   is an increasing function implying that
 (z0) = 1. Of course, z0 2 [0;1], since otherwise there would be no production at
all in one of the countries.
Step II










Hence, for pK=pL > p
K=p






































Since (z0;1) > (0;z0), (23) is only fullled for suciently great dierences in



















Note that (23) implies ! > !. Figure 4 illustrates the static equilibrium for
suciently great dierences in factor endowments.
Eventually, our endogenous determination of the range of available machines
will show (see Section 4) that NK=NL < N
K=N
L holds as long as K=L < K=L.
This implies that our condition for the above discussed specialization pattern
always holds in the long{run equilibrium of the model. The condition also holds
in the instantaneous equilibrium as long as relative physical factor endowments
do not change too drastically. 
The nal condition to completely describe the static equilibrium of the model
is the trade{balance condition that requires the value of imports to equal the value













(wLL + wKK)dz: (25)
Since we do not include any constraints on the distribution of foreign trade
income between the factors (see (2)), the variables in parentheses in (25) are
independent from z0. Hence, the trade{balance condition can be presented as












which is equivalent to:
z0
































From (26), (27) and the factor{market{clearing conditions for both countries (eqs.
(18) evaluated for the respective factor endowments and produced ranges of goods
for the home country and for the foreign country) we obtain (see Appendix for








with 0(K=K) > 0.
Lemma 1. For suciently great dierences in relative eective factor endow-
ments between countries there exists a negative interrelation between the relative
capital endowments in the two countries and the equilibrium specialization thresh-
old z0 (from (28)).
4 Dynamic Equilibrium
We can now solve the steady state of the dynamic equilibrium of the model.
Prot{maximizing technology monopolists producing j-type machines gener-
ate more innovations in the sector j (j = K;L), where they expect higher prots
(higher prices for their machines). Using our results from the static equilibrium












With short{run equilibrium values of the relative factor price determined by (18),









With respect to the production of machines we apply the lab{equipment spec-
ication of Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). With Rj denoting the spending of
R&D for type j machines6 and j being constant scale factors allowing for the
costs of innovations in the two sectors to dier, we have
_ NK = KRK and _ NL = LRL : (30)
In steady state, NK and NL grow at the same rate. This implies the technology{
6Following Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), only the nal good is used in generating new
innovations.
15market{clearing condition
KK = LL : (31)











where   K=L. Hence, the higher the average capital intensity of the range
of nal goods produced in the economy, the higher the incentives to innovate
in type K machines and the higher the long{run ratio NK=NL. Specically, in
the equilibrium of the two{country model with the home country specializing on
nal products z 2 [0;z0], while the foreign country specializes on nal products











The result in (33) is just what we supposed for our analysis of the static
equilibrium. Notice that the equilibrium stated above is stable. If equation
(31) is not satised, machine producers concentrate only on the sector that is
more protable to produce in. Since K=L is decreasing in NK=NL (see (29))
the system always returns to the steady state: if NK=NL is higher than in (32)
monopolists produce only labor{substituting machines until the system equalities
are satised, and vice versa.
5 Capital Flows and Dynamic CAs
We can now apply our model to the analysis of dynamics of comparative advan-
tages associated with an inow of capital. In Section 3 we supposed that in the
home country capital is the relative scarce factor. Let us also assume here that
the foreign country is abundant in capital (like industrialized countries), while
the home country is labor abundant (like developing countries or economies in
16transition). As an example we can take the EU and the CEE countries, respec-
tively.
For suciently great dierences in relative factor endowments, our model
generates the following equilibrium eects: (i) ! > !, (ii) NK=NL < N
K=N
L,
and (iii) the home country has CA for nal products z 2 [0;z0], the foreign
country for z 2 [z0;1].
Suppose now that capital ows into the home country (caused by the dif-
ferences in relative factor prices).7 However, we do not assume fully integrated
capital markets with full equalization of factor prices. If that were the case,
capital{market integration would result in full diversication of the nal{goods
sector with the well{known indeterminacy of production precluding any analysis
of CAs (cf. Dornbusch et al. (1980)).
As capital ows into the home country, we observe a decline in ! and an
increase in ! for given z0 (with given Nj's) in the short{run, i.e.: for given
pattern of specialization. See left plot in Figure 5 for an illustration (shifts from
!0 to !1 and !
0 to !
1, respectively). In the medium{run, for given technologies,
the pattern of specialization adjusts. According to Lemma 1, the capital ow
from the capital{abundant country to the labor{abundant one generates a change
in the pattern of specialization with the latter country specializing on a larger
spectrum of nal goods and the former country producing a narrower range of





0) triggering relative factor prices in both countries
to shift upwards (from !1 to !2 and !
1 to !
2). This is due to the property
of the function (z;z) described. Thus, in the foreign country, which exports
capital, ! rises both due to the capital outow and reduction in the range of
nal goods produced in the economy (increase in the average capital intensity).
In contrast, in the home country ! rstly falls due to the capital inow, but then
rises due to the increase of capital intensity used in production. However, as a
whole ! decreases since the capital inow is the major triggering factor of this
dynamics, and the incentive for further capital transfer (dierence in the capital
income between countries) has to decrease. In the long{run, the shift in z0 creates
incentives for further innovations ( _ Nj).
7Given the complexity of the model, including dierences in factor endowments and tech-
nologies between countries, and endogenous technical change, we simplify our analysis to a
one{time capital inow.
17Figure 5: Comparative statics in the two{country model
Lab{equipment model
Due to the increase in the cuto value z0, technology monopolists in both countries
get an incentive to innovate in the sector of capital (see (32)). Hence, both NK=NL
and N
K=N
L rise and trigger the relative factor prices pK=pL in both countries






Thus, while the 'price eect' of ! boosts CAs in capital intensive goods only in


















As a result, while the technical change is induced towards capital intensive goods
in both countries, CAs in these goods are shifted in favor of the home economy.
State{dependent R&D
In order to dierentiate the impact of z0 on technological progress in the two
countries we need to consider state{dependent (also called knowledge{driven)
R&D (see Acemoglu (2002) and Romer (1990) for discussion) instead of the lab{
18equipment specication8.
Let us assume that economic growth due to R&D cannot be maintained simply
by increasing R&D expenditure (R). Thus, we take the production functions of
new machines as follows:




j Si; i;j 2 (L;K); i 6= j; (35)
where S  SL + SK is a limited R&D sta (scientists) that cannot be extended
and  2 [0;1] measures the degree of state dependence. It can be shown that
when  = 0, further results are similar to the ones stated above. However, if
 > 0, results can vary signicantly. Thus, for  = 1 improvements in labor
intensive machines make future innovations in this industry cheaper without any
eect on the other sector.
One can interpret  as an extent of inter{sectoral knowledge spillovers (KSs).
However, there is a clear tradeo between inter{ and intra{sectoral KSs in (35). If
 = 0, both sectors equally benet from current research in one of them, but this
research aects future production in the respective sector to a smaller extent. In
contrast, if  = 1, one sector exhibits higher gains from inventions in this sector
without any impact on the other one.
In this paper we argue that both  = 0 and  = 1 are extreme cases. In the
context of the economic globalization it is both unlikely that two sectors do not
jointly benet from technical progress in one of them ( 6= 1)9 or make an equal
use of technological improvements made in any of the sectors ( 6= 0).
In the following we assume that  ! 0 for the industrialized country (weak
intra-sectoral KSs) and  ! 1 for the developing economy (strong intra-sectoral
KSs). The reason for this is that considering the industrialized country as the one
possessing a larger knowledge stock in a given technology a new idea might not
generate the same spillovers as when this stock is relatively small (Jones 1995).
This assumption is considered to be the major one because of the evidence that
8Both approaches present the supply side of innovations, which is referred in the literature to
the 'innovation possibilities frontier' or the 'state dependence', putting the dynamics of future
R&D in dependance on the present situation (for more details see also Kennedy (1964)).
9In the last decades a number of studies have conrmed KSs stimulating technological
progress within a given location (Romer 1990, Boshuizen et al. 2009). Among mechanisms
reinforcing economic growth are, e.g., knowledge diusion across innovative companies and
labor market matching. For an overview of the mechanisms see Serrano and Cabrer (2004).
19knowledge ows more easily within sectors than between them (Keller 2002).10

















Based on equation (38) we can dierentiate between the incentives for technol-
ogy monopolists to innovate in the sector of type K machines as long as  2 (0;1).
In fact, if  = 0 equations (36-37) can be reduced back to (31-32). In contrast,
if  = 1 the stability condition is not satised (Section 4). Hence, no stable
equilibrium can be achieved.
In comparison to the results from (32), an important distinction here is the
rate of FBTC. Because of (1 ) in (37-38), the technological progress in capital
intensive goods and CAs in this sector are both amplied depending on the KS'
extent. Therefore, benets both from technology improvements and price reduc-
tions are potentially higher for the home country than for the foreign one (that
translates in a further increase in z0 in the long{run).12 This nding explains the
convergence eect in productivity (NK=NL ! N
K=N
L) one observes in the CEE
countries over the last decades accompanied by the remarkable growth in CAs in
capital intensive goods (Zaghini 2005).
Remember, in (35) we specied S as a limited resource. Hence, for a sustained
10Alternatively, we could imply that inter{sectoral spillovers are stronger for the advanced
country (where tighter technological linkages between industries are expected, e.g., electronics
and automotive industry). Hence, the latter interpretation for  >  is also seen to be plausible.
11The transformations presented in (36-37) can be obtained similar to (31-32) with the dis-
tinction that K=L = LN
L=KN
K.
12If, in contrast, one would assume  <  (i.e.: the home country being unable to generate
more KSs and produce innovative goods), a divergence eect in productivity will be obtained.
Thus, KSs are considered as a key factor of success for technological catch{up in develop-
ing countries. Similarly, contrasting Far Eastern and Latin American countries, Castaldi and
Dosi (2008) stress the role of patterns of information distribution and interaction (resulting in
dierent learning capabilities of individuals and organizations) for economic growth.
20growth we need other factors (NL and NK) to become more productive over time
or, in other words, accumulate these factors. This is by all means a more time-
consuming process than the one presented in (30). Therefore, impacts of the
price and the market size eects must be dierentiated in time. While the price
eect comes into force quickly, the market size eect follows with a time lag
that is dependent, e.g, on the distance to frontier for each particular country,
on the ineciencies presented on the market of technology monopolists in those
countries.
6 Discussion
6.1 Parallel with PCAs
The main assumption of the model stated that allows us to reveal factors directing
a technical bias between sectors is the assumption on technology monopolists
comparing expected prots from their investments in dierent technologies. A
similar intuition has the concept of prospective comparative advantages (PCAs)
(see Savin and Winker (2009)) that forecast CA dynamics in transition economies.
The PCAs are based on dierences in relative prices of products in dierent
countries. For the PCA to be ecient one needs to know the direction that relative
prices follow in the future. Assuming price convergence in the long{run, PCAs
identify potential CAs in industries, where nal goods are undervalued in com-
parison to the international price level. Hence, in the future these industries are
potentially protable for investors. In a similar way, the FBTC concept 'directs'
technical progress towards industries expecting factor inow and, consequently,
an increase in the intensity of its employment (Section 4).
The PCA index provided good results in forecasting CAs on the example of
CEE countries. Most of the 'successful' industries, where these countries managed
to gain CAs, were undervalued in comparison to the EU.
In fact, there is a large body of empirical evidence that the CA dynamics
is driven by the competitive advantages measured by means of, e.g, unit labor
costs, R&D intensity or real exchange rates (see, e.g., Wziatek-Kubiak and Winek
(2005)). An important distinction of the PCA method is that it encompasses more
information on the competitiveness of goods and distinguishes between industries
of a particular economy, 'substituting' the mentioned indicators.
21In contrast, our model does not 'substitute' the PCA index, but 'complements'
it. Practically, the model sheds light on the micro{foundations explaining the
rapid growth of CAs in technologically advanced industries of the CEE countries.
Thus, for transition economies the concept explains the behavior of technology
monopolists that produce innovations in capital intensive technologies, strength-
ening CA formation in respective industries.
However, technical change biases alone should not be considered as sucient
to benet from CAs. Otherwise, we would observe CAs in the EU accession
countries on a much larger variety of goods. There must be a dierent factor
'allowing' transition economies to form CAs towards their trade partners. The
simple reason for this is the fact that we need to account not only for the tech-
nical progress in the home country (with capital inow), but also for the state
of technology in the foreign economy (exporting capital) as well as for other fac-
tors, responsible for CAs between countries, including, e.g., scale of production,
consumption preferences.
Therefore, for transition economies a primary condition for CAs to arise is
a presence of unrealized CAs assuring that they potentially have an advantage
towards other economies in a particular sector. And a good instrument available
to forecast the unexploited advantages is the PCA index.
6.2 Implications for Industrial Policy
Combining our model and the PCA index in one concept we refer to a well{known
discussion in the theory of industrial organization: should countries stimulate
innovations in high technological industries or in sectors with strongest CAs (see,
e.g., Rodriguez-Clare (2005)).
Considering high technological industries as the ones with highest 'Marshallian
externalities' (MEs), which present benets from KSs between companies in the
same (or related) industries, Rodriguez-Clare (2005) identies two constraints for
policies promoting industries, where MEs are expected to be stronger.
First, in contrast to CAs, MEs are not an intrinsic feature of particular indus-
tries. A large variety of factors (including technologies used and country{specic
characteristics) inuences MEs' success. In fact, both MEs and FBTCs depend
on rms' innovative activity and are stochastic in their nature. Hence, no 'guar-
anteed' benets from these processes exist.
22Second, even if an industry exhibits strong MEs, benets generated from
these externalities can be also attributed to another country specializing in this
industry. If the foreign economy exhibits a CA in this sector, it can neutralize
benets for the home country (for a formal prove see Rodriguez-Clare (2005)).
As a result, a general approach for countries stimulating their economic growth
is to promote industries with natural CAs and not those with stronger MEs. For
the least developed countries this simply means that they should stimulate pre-
dominantly agriculture and mining industries. Fortunately, transition economies,
as e.g., CEE countries or certain members of the Commonwealth of Independent
States (e.g., Russia, Belarus), have a better choice.
As discussed by Savin and Winker (2009), transition economies may exhibit
CAs not realized yet due to various distortions in their trade relations. Directing
technical progress towards capital intensive industries, these countries can en-
hance their natural CAs in corresponding industries with an additional 'technical
advantage' generated by the FBTC Since the technical advantage is stochastic,
it should be considered as a 'complementary' factor. Hence, the main decisions
on development priorities are more accurate based on the PCA analysis.
Based on the analysis of capital{market integration presented in Section 5,
transition economies can stimulate technical progress in capital intensive indus-
tries by enhancing factor mobility and attracting foreign investments. The CEE
countries have successfully solved this task and have improved their industrial
structure of foreign trade. For other economies in transition (as, e.g., Russia)
this remains a major challenge in their aim to modernize the economy.
The PCA analysis made on the example of Russia in the period 2002{2007
revealed the following industries as the ones with PCAs: electronic equipment,
machinery building, railway equipment and pharmaceutical industry (Savin and
Winker 2009). However, realization of these advantages is not as straightforward
as it might seem at rst sight.
Based on the analysis presented above, there are two main conditions for
this. First, it is necessary to minimize trade distortions13 of Russia with its main
trading partners. This can be made, e.g., by joining the WTO or by forming a
free trade agreement with the EU (both scenarios are well discussed in literature,
see, e.g., Brenton et al. (1997) and Jensen et al. (2007)). Second, to stimulate
13Under trade distortions numerous tari and non{tari restrictions as well as exchange rate
misalignments are meant.
23CAs in technologically advanced industries, inow of scarcer factor (K) is re-
quired. Thus, according to our model, CAs can be stimulated with no articial
price distortions or other potentially inecient public interventions. Instead, for
transition economies to attract FDI, in parallel with (already available) natural
resources and relatively cheap labor force, policy liberalization (including, among
others, transparent regulatory framework, ease of market entry and exit) and
political stability are of great importance (Mizanur Rahman 2010).
There is also one more instrument stimulating economic growth in the model
we want to address in this study. Due to the form of production functions spec-
ied in (4) and the assumption of state dependent R&D (35), the rate of eco-
nomic growth of any particular economy is crucially dependent on accumulation
of technologies (Ni) that increase factor eciency. Since we assume that machine{
producers are monopolists, it is important to consider the problem of potential
market ineciency resulting in a low rate of investments in R&D.
Since 'technology monopolists' produce new varieties of machines over time
( _ Ni;t), they obviously need to accumulate funds for their R&D activity. Hence,
enforcing perfect competition is no good solution to stimulate the monopolists.
There is a long discussion in the theory of industrial organization on whether
competitive pressure induces or reduces innovative output of companies. During
the last decade, the idea of an inverse 'U{curve' dependence of innovative activi-
ties on the competition intensity has become the prevailing concept (see Aghion
et al. (2005) and Bucci and Parello (2009)). It was empirically conrmed that
in contrast to monopoly, competition raises incentives to innovate, but an exces-
sive competitive pressure damages innovative performance. Therefore, a balanced
public regulation policy is required to stimulate 'technology monopolists'.
Furthermore, public authorities can implement a variety of other measures
to support 'technology producers'. One of the main instruments is to stimulate
the above mentioned knowledge spillovers (denoted with the  parameter in our
model). Doing this, authorities potentially enhance the benets on technological
progress and CAs. Among measures stimulating KSs, one could think about in-
vestments in human capital that increases the absorptive capacity of companies
(Borensztein et al. 1998, Bilbao-Osorio and Rodriguez-Pose 2004, Bijsterbosch
and Kolasa 2010) and knowledge diusion centers (e.g., CORDIS and Innova-
tive Relay Centres) that transfer knowledge between research and industry, and
24promote cooperation between companies.
Further public measures can include improvements in infrastructure (in par-
ticular, transport and telecommunication) widely recognized as signicant factors
stimulating cooperation and innovative activity of companies (see, e.g., Cainelli
et al. (2006)). For both an overview of the methods that can be implemented
and an empirical estimate of their inuence based on the Russian regional data
see Savin and Winker (forthcoming).
7 Conclusion
In this paper we integrate technology{based with factor endowment{based views
on trade in modelling eects resulting from capital{market integration. We
demonstrate that the model suggested eectively explains the capital{biased tech-
nical change observed in a number of developing and transition economies over
the last decades. Furthermore, accounting for the state{dependant R&D pro-
cesses, we can dierentiate in time the eects of capital inow on specialization
patterns explaining the time lags in CA responses observed empirically.
We demonstrate that the model has a similar idea as the PCA instrument:
relative protabilities of goods determine future direction of technical progress
and, consequently, CA dynamics. Moreover, this study extends the PCA index
providing an additional information on CA formation. Together, this model and
the PCA index constitute a good instrument explaining the success of the CEE
countries in diversifying their foreign trade structure.
In addition, a series of measures for countries being in the period of transition
(e.g., Russia) to realize their potential CAs is discussed. In particular, eec-
tive measures on trade liberalization together with attraction of scarce factors
(capital) are meant. Since the market of technology innovations is potentially
inecient (monopolistic), this study supports public measures to stimulate inno-
vative activity of companies. This can be achieved by stimulation of knowledge
spillovers and a variety of other instruments (see, among others, Savin and Winker
(forthcoming) for a discussion).
To keep the exposition simple, this paper has a number of simplifying assump-
tions. An obvious generalization is to introduce CES{type production functions
and allow for factors and machines to compliment each other in production. So
25far, a specic case of technological process was considered. Another interesting
direction for future research would be to account for international KSs transferred
by, e.g., multinational enterprizes endogenizing the rate of the spillovers (). Fi-
nally, the most important area for future research is an empirical assessment of
the eects resulting from the capital{market integration in developing countries.
In particular, having industry{based data, one could measure the eect of capital
inow on R&D intensity and, consequently, on CA formation quantitatively.14
Acknowledgements Thanks are due to participants of the 13th workshop on
international economic relations in G ottingen and colleagues from the DFG pro-
gram 'Economics of Innovative Change' in Jena for their constructive comments
that helped to improve the paper. All shortcomings are our responsibility.
Ivan Savin gratefully acknowledges nancial support from the German Aca-
demic Exchange Service (DAAD).
Appendix
Derivation of the condition for z0 (Lemma 1)
This appendix shows how the specialization threshold z0 is related to factor en-
dowments. From (26) follows that
z0
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14Hitherto, to the best of our knowledge, only the eect of FDI on productivity level (mea-
sured either as labor or total factor productivity) was considered in literature (see among others,
Holland and Pain (1998), Barrell and Holland (2000), Smarzynska Javorcik (2004), Bijsterbosch
and Kolasa (2010)).
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we can show that z0 is monotonously increasing in K=K.
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1  L=L with '. Thus, we
need to show that  is monotonously decreasing in z0 8 ' as long as (43) holds.
While g(z0) in (44) is a monotonously decreasing function in z0, the behavior
of the complete function is dependent on the value of ' in h(z0). In particular,
the r.h.s. of (44) remains monotonously decreasing as long as ' is greater than a
critical value of about 0:21 while it shows a spike in its performance otherwise.15
The properties of (44) are illustrated in Figure 6 for dierent ' values.16 Impor-
tant, however, is that 8 ' < 0:21 the ambiguity in z0 we obtain (as on the right
plot of Figure 6) is always for values below 1 in , i.e. in the interval, where our
15This result is obtained via a simulation study and is also conrmed analytically.
16On the left plot of Figure 6  2 (1;0].
27model is not applicable (without suciently great dierences in relative eective
factor endowments) since from (43)  >> 1=' must hold.17 Hence, in accord
with our assumptions z0 is monotonously increasing in K=K:

0(K=K
) > 0 (45)
for the relevant set of parameter values. 
Figure 6: Interrelationship between z0 and  for dierent '
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